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Abstract
We introduce rm and worker heterogeneity into a model of innovation-driven endogenous
growth. Individuals who di¤er in ability sort into either a research sector or a manufacturing
sector that produces di¤erentiated goods. Each research project generates a new variety of the
di¤erentiated product and a random technology for producing it. Technologies di¤er in com-
plexity and productivity, and technological sophistication is complementary to worker ability.
We study the co-determination of growth and income inequality in both the closed and open
economy, as well as the spillover e¤ects of policy and conditions in one country to outcomes in
others.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between growth and inequality has been much studied and much debated. Scholars
have advanced a number of hypotheses linking growth to inequality, with causation running in one
direction or the other. Yet attempts to substantiate the proposed mechanisms and to measure their
empirical relevance have been stymied by inadequate data and methodological pitfalls. Kuznets
(1955, 1963), for example, famously advanced the hypothesis that income inequality rst rises then
falls over the course of economic development. While the Kuznets curve an inverted-U shaped
relationship between inequality and stage of development has been established for the small set
of countries that Kuznets considered, subsequent studies using broader data sets cast doubt on the
ubiquity of this relationship.1
Inequality might a¤ect growth via several channels, such as if rich and poor households di¤er in
their propensity to save (Kaldor, 1955-56), if poor households face credit constraints that limit their
ability to invest in human capital (Galor and Zeira, 1993), or if greater inequality generates more
redistribution and thus a di¤erent incentive structure via the political process (Alesina and Rodrik,
1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994). While all of these mechanisms are plausible, quantitative
assessment has proven elusive due to the fact that a countrys growth rates and income inequality
are jointly determined. A similar problem has plagued attempts to assess the relationship between
trade and growth (see Helpman, 2004, ch.6).
The historical record shows rising inequality in the distribution of personal income in the world
economy from the early part of the 19th century when growth accelerated after the industrial
revolution until well into the 20th century. The evolution of income inequality during this period
reects trends in within-country inequality and trends in between-country inequality. Table 1,
drawn from Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) and Morrisson and Murtin (2011a), provides a
decomposition of these long-run trends, using the Theil Index as a measure of per capita income
inequality.2 The table shows that between-country inequality has risen over time throughout the
course of almost two centuries, while the time path for within-country inequality has been more
uneven. Such inequality rose steadily between 1820 and World War I, declined through the Great
Depression and into the 1970s, and rose again subsequently.3 During the same period, growth in
world per capita income accelerated until World War I, declined between the two world wars, and
accelerated again after World War II, up until the oil crisis of 1973 (see Maddison, 2001). The rst
and second waves of globalization roughly correspond with the periods of rapid growth. It appears
1See Helpman (2004, ch.4) for a survey of this evidence.
2The normalized Theil Index I for a set of income levels fyig; i = 1; : : : ; N , is dened by
I =
1
N lnN
NX
i=1

yi
y
ln

yi
y

where y is the mean of y. It ranges from zero, when all incomes are the same, to one, when one individual enjoys all
of the aggregate income.
3Sala-i-Martin (2006) reports further increases in within-country inequality as measured by the Theil Index for
the period from 1992 to 2000, but declining between-country inequality, mostly due to rapid growth in China and
India.
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Table 1: Income Inequality Within and Between Countries
Source: Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) and Morrisson and Murtin (2011a)
Theil Index of Income Inequality
Within Countries Between Countries
1700 0.45 0.04
1820 0.46 0.05
1870 0.48 0.19
1910 0.50 0.30
1929 0.41 0.37
1960 0.32 0.46
1980 0.33 0.50
1992 0.34 0.54
2000 0.35 0.51
2008 0.36 0.39
Figure 1: Growth versus change in inequality in a cross-section of countries.
Source: Morrisson and Murtin (2011b)
that at a broad, historical level, trade, growth and inequality have been positively correlated.
In more recent data, a link between growth and income inequality can be seen in a cross section
of countries using the data reported by Morrisson and Murtin (2011b). They tabulate the Gini
coe¢ cients of disposable income for 35 countries at varying stages of development, for a pair of
years chosen based on data availability. Typically, the rst observation for each country is for a
year in the early 1990s and the second is for a year in the mid-2000s. As well, they report real
GDP per inhabitant in 1992 and in 2008. In Figure 1, we plot the annual growth rate in per capita
income against the percentage change in the Gini coe¢ cient per annum for these 35 countries. The
positive correlation between the two measures is quite apparent.
The aim of this paper is to explore theoretically the relationship between long-run growth and
income inequality and to understand the role that international integration plays in mediating this
relationship.4 To this end, we introduce worker and rm heterogeneity into a familiar model of
4Because we are interested in long-run growth and income inequality, we will focus our analysis on balanced growth
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endogenous growth à la Romer (1990). Here, the accumulation of knowledge serves as the engine
of growth and is itself a by-product of purposive innovation undertaken to develop new products.
Our model of trade, international knowledge di¤usion, and growth extends the simplest, one-sector
model from Grossman and Helpman (1991).5 The advantage of the framework we develop here
is that it allows us to consider the entire distribution of earnings that emanates from a given
distribution of worker abilities and rm productivity levels, and not just, say, the skill premium
(i.e., the relative wage of skilledversus unskilledworkers), which has been the focus of much
of the existing theoretical literature.
Our analysis provides potential explanations for cross-di¤erences in wage distributions and
generates predictions about how technology and policy changes will a¤ect wages at di¤erent points
in the distribution and measures of aggregate income inequality.6 Our interest in the entirety of the
wage distribution reects our understanding that distributions vary considerably across countries
and over time. Take, for example, Table 2, which displays the ratio of the fth decile of mens
earnings to the bottom decile of earnings and the ratio of the ninth decile of mens earnings to
the fth decile of earnings for two di¤erent years and ten di¤erent OECD countries.7 In the rst
column of the table, we see that middle-income male earners fared much better in the United States
compared to the bottom-tier workers than did their counterparts in France, yet the earnings of this
group compared to the top-decile workers was about the same. The distribution in Canada was
notably di¤erent from that in France, with a high ratio of fth decile relative to rst decile wages,
but a more modest ratio of ninth decile wages relative to fth decile.
The table shows as well that countries have experienced di¤erent changes over time. In some,
like Ireland, Japan and Norway, wage inequality seems to have increased at both the bottom of
the distribution (increase in the earnings of the fth decile relative to the rst decile) and at the
top (increase in the earnings of the ninth decile relative to the fth decile). In Canada and the
United Kingdom, there was little change at the bottom end but a notable increase in equality at the
top, whereas the pattern was just the opposite in Germany. Finally, in France, inequality declined
modestly at both ends of the distribution.
Data on the U.S. income distribution are available for a longer span of time. Kopczuk et al.
(2010) use social security records to establish U-shaped patterns for the evolution from 1939 to
2004 of the ratio of the 80th to 50th percentile male earner and the ratio of the 50th to 20th
paths. As such, we will not be able to speak directly to the data illustrated in Figure 1, which arguably related to
transition paths in most of the countries in the sample.
5 In Grossman and Helpman (1991), we devote several chapters to models with two or more industrial sectors in
order to address the impact of intersectoral resource allocation on growth and relative factor prices. By considering
here a model with one industrial sector, we neglect this important, additional channel for trade to inuence growth
and income distribution.
6Note, however, that our framework does not include a role for superstarsand so is ill-suited to speak to evidence
such as that emphasized by Atkinson et al. (2011) that income shares have been growing dramatically of late at the
very top end of the distribution.
7We focus on mens earnings, because we have nothing to say about the substantial cross-country di¤erences in
female labor-market participation rates. We report observations for 2000 and 2007, because the former are the earliest
available in the OECD data set and the latter are the latest that do not reect the impact of the nancial crisis and
resulting Great Recession.
3
Table 2: Earnings Inequality in OECD Countries
Source: OECD StatExtracts. Accessed on February 28, 2014
2000 2007
Decile 5/Decile 1 Decile 9/Decile 5 Decile 5/Decile 1 Decile 9/Decile 5
Canada 2.00 1.74 2.00 1.81
France 1.56 2.11 1.52 2.09
Germany 1.65 1.82 1.78 1.82
Ireland 1.81 1.89 1.94 1.98
Japan 1.59 1.73 1.62 1.77
Korea 1.97 1.88 2.21 2.13
Norway 1.44 1.50 1.58 1.55
Sweden 1.40 1.74 1.42 1.72
UK 1.83 1.89 1.83 2.02
U.S.A. 2.14 2.24 2.15 2.40
Figure 2: Evolution of inequality in the United States
Source: Kopczuk et al. (2010)
percentile male earner (see Figure 2). Both ratios fell until the early-to-mid 1950s and generally
rose after 1970. However, the 1960s and 1990s were periods of a declining relative wage for the
median male earner compared to both the 80th and 20th percentile earner; Autor (2010) refers to
the latter period as one of hollowing out of the middle class.While the intention of this paper is
not to o¤er explanations for the observed di¤erences across space and across time, the variation in
outcomes and experiences do motivate our interest in the determinants of the earnings prole. We
shall see that our model can generate diverse patterns across countries and provides a link between
income distribution and the economys structural and policy features.
In the next section, we develop our model in the context of a closed economy. A country is
populated by heterogeneous individuals who di¤er in ability. The economy produces a single con-
sumption good with di¤erentiated intermediate inputs. Blueprints for the intermediate goods are
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the result of prior innovation e¤orts and are held by rms that engage in monopolistic competition.
These rms have access to di¤erent technologies and can hire workers of any ability. A rms total
output is the sum of the outputs of its various employees and the productivity of any employee
depends on his ability and on the rms technology. Moreover, ability and technology are comple-
mentary, so that more able workers are especially productive when they apply more sophisticated
technologies. In equilibrium, the rms with access to the better technologies hire the more able
workers.
Innovation drives growth. Firms invest in R&D by hiring individuals to serve as inventors.
An inventor develops new varieties at a rate that depends on his own ability and the stock of
knowledge capital available in the economy. Knowledge accumulates with R&D experience and
is non-proprietary, as in Romer (1990). When an inventor develops a new variety, the invention
generates for the rm a draw from a distribution of technologies. Thus, returns to investment
in R&D are random and higher for rms that are lucky enough to draw good (sophisticated)
technologies than for rms that draw less good (simple) technologies. There is free entry into
R&D, so at every moment with positive innovation, the momentary cost of a new variety in light
of the state of knowledge matches the expected present discounted value of prots that will result
from the random technology draw.
Since rms make zero expected returns and rm ownership is shared widely, the (pre-tax) income
distribution is determined in the competitive labor market. The heterogenous individuals sort into
the research and manufacturing activities. We assume that ability confers a comparative advantage
in R&D and describe an equilibrium in which all individuals with ability above some endogenous
cuto¤ level engage in research. For those who choose to work in manufacturing, there is competition
among the rms that produce intermediate goods with di¤erent technologies. The complementarity
between ability and technology delivers positive assortative matching. These competitive forces of
sorting and matching dictate the economys wage distribution.
After developing the model, we show how the long-run growth rate and income distribution
are co-determined in a steady-state equilibrium. More specically, we derive a pair of equations
that jointly determine the time-invariant growth rate in the number of varieties and the cuto¤
ability level that divides manufacturing workers from inventors. Once we know the rate of growth
in the variety of intermediate goods, we can calculate the rate of growth of nal output and the
rate of growth of wages. Once we know the cuto¤ ability level, we can calculate (as we show) the
entire distribution of relative wages. We conclude Section 2 by discussing how di¤erent income
distributions can be compared and adopt an ordinal ranking of inequality that is scale invariant
and respects second-order stochastic dominance.8
In Section 3, we compare growth rates and income inequality across countries that di¤er in their
technological parameters and policy choices. In this section, we focus on isolated countries that do
not trade and do not benet from any knowledge spillovers from abroad. We nd, for example,
8Specically, we shall say that one income distribution is more unequal than another if after adjusting one distri-
bution by a proportional shift to equate mean wages, the former distribution represents a mean-preserving spread of
the latter.
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that Hicks-neutral di¤erences in labor productivity in manufacturing that apply across the full
range of ability levels do not generate long-run di¤erences in growth rates or income inequality,
although they do imply di¤erences in income and consumption levels. In contrast, di¤erences in
innovation capacity do generate di¤erences in growth and inequality. Innovation capacity is
the product of a parameter that measures the size of a countrys labor force, a parameter that
reects its ability to convert research experience into knowledge capital, and a parameter that
reects inventors productivity in R&D. A country with greater innovation capacity grows faster
in autarky but experiences greater income inequality. Subsidies to R&D nanced by proportional
wage taxes also contribute to faster growth but greater inequality. Finally, we compare countries
that di¤er in the set of production technologies from which their successful innovators draw. We
show that better technology draws can generate an income distribution with higher relative wages
in the middle relative to both extremes.
Section 4 addresses the impacts of globalization. Here, intermediate inputs are tradable subject
to arbitrary iceberg trading costs and import tari¤s. We follow Grossman and Helpman (1991) by
introducing international sharing of knowledge capital and, in fact, allow for an arbitrary pattern of
(positive) international spillovers. In particular, the knowledge stock in each country is a weighted
sum of accumulated R&D experience in all countries including itself, with an arbitrary matrix of
weighting parameters. We study a balanced-growth equilibrium in which the number of varieties
of intermediate goods grows at the same constant rate in all countries. Even allowing for a wide
range of di¤erences in technologies and policies, we nd that the long-run growth rate is higher
in every country in the trading equilibrium than in autarky, but so too is the resulting inequality
in incomes. Neither di¤erences in manufacturing productivity, in trade frictions, or in innovation
capacity generate long-run di¤erences in income inequality. In fact, no matter what the pattern
of international knowledge spillovers, if R&D subsidies are the same in a pair of countries and
their inventors draw from the same technology distributions, their relative-wage distributions will
converge in the long-run.9 Di¤erences in support for R&D do give rise to long-run di¤erences in
wage inequality, as a higher subsidy goes hand in hand with a greater spread in wages. Also, if
inventors in di¤erent countries draw from di¤erent technology sets, their income distributions will
di¤er in the long run. We identify conditions under which a country that draws from a better set
of technologies has greater inequality at the lower end of the income distribution, but similar or
less inequality at the upper end. In Section 4, we also examine how various policy and parameter
changes a¤ect long-run growth and inequality measures in the open economy both at home and
abroad. For example, we show that an increase in the R&D subsidy rate in any country accelerates
growth and raises inequality in all of them, as does an improvement in a countrys ability to absorb
knowledge spillovers from abroad.
Section 5 concludes and an appendix contains supporting technical details.
9Note, however, that the levels of all wages can vary across countries to reect local conditions.
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2 The Basic Model
In this section, we develop a model of economic growth featuring heterogeneous workers and hetero-
geneous rms. In the model, endogenous innovation drives growth. Workers, who di¤er in ability,
engage either in R&D or in manufacturing. Research generates new varieties of di¤erentiated inter-
mediate inputs. Firms that produce these inputs operate di¤erent technologies. In the equilibrium,
the heterogeneous workers sort into one of the two activities and rms with di¤erent technologies
hire di¤erent types of workers. The economy converges to a long-run equilibrium with a constant
growth rate of nal output and a xed and continuous distribution of income.
We describe here the economic environment for a closed economy and defer the introduction of
international trade until Section 4.
2.1 Demand and Supply for Consumption Goods
The economy is populated by a mass N of individuals indexed by ability level, a. The cumulative
distribution of abilities is given by H (a), which is twice continuously di¤erentiable and has a
positive density H 0 (a) > 0 on the bounded support, [amin; amax].
Each individual maximizes a logarithmic utility function
ut =
Z 1
t
e ( t) log cd (1)
where c is consumption at time  and  is the common, subjective discount rate. The consumption
good serves as numeraire; its price at every moment is normalized to one. It follows from the
individuals intertemporal optimization problem that
_ct
ct
= t   , (2)
where t is the interest rate at time t in terms of consumption goods. Inasmuch as a varies across
individuals, so does income and consumption.
Consumption goods are assembled from an evolving set 
t of di¤erentiated intermediate inputs.
Dropping the time subscript for notational convenience, the production function for these goods at
a moment when the set of available inputs is 
 is given by
X =
Z
!2

x (!)
 1
 d!
 
 1
,  > 1, (3)
where x (!) is the input of variety !. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs is
constant and equal to .
The market for consumption goods is competitive. It follows that the equilibrium price of these
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goods reects the minimum unit cost of producing them. Since X is the numeraire, we have
Z
!2

p (!)1  d!
 1
1 
= 1; (4)
where p (!) is the price of intermediate input !.
2.2 Supply, Demand, Pricing, and Prots of Intermediate Goods
Once an intermediate good has been invented, it is produced by monopolistically-competitive rms
using labor as the sole input. Firms that manufacture these goods are distinguished by their
technology, '. A rm with a higher ' is more productive, no matter what type(s) of workers it
hires. Consider a rm that produces variety ! using technology ' and that hires a set L! of workers
types with densities `! (a). In such circumstances, the rms output is
x (!) =
Z
a2L!
 ('; a) `! (a) da; (5)
where  ('; a) is the productivity of workers of type a when applying technology '. Notice that
productivity (given ') is independent of !.
We suppose that more productive technologies are also more complex and that more able workers
have a comparative advantage in operating the more complex technologies. In other words, we posit
a complementarity between the type of technology ' and the type of worker a in determining labor
productivity. Formally, we adopt
Assumption 1 The productivity function  ('; a) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly in-
creasing, and strictly log supermodular.
Assumption 1 implies  'a > 0 for all ' and a.
As is known from Costinot (2009), Eeckhout and Kircher (2013), Sampson (2013) and else-
where, the strict log supermodularity of  () implies that, for a generic wage schedule w (a), each
manufacturing rm hires a single type of labor that is most appropriate given its technology ',
and there is positive assortative matching (PAM) between rm types and worker types. We denote
by m (') the ability of workers employed by all rms that produce a variety of intermediate by
operating a technology '; PAM is revealed in the fact that m0 (') > 0.
Shephards lemma gives the demand for any variety ! as a function of the prices of all available
intermediate goods, namely
x (!) = X
Z
2

p ()1  d
 
1 
p(!) :
In view of (4), demand for variety ! can be expressed as
x (!) = Xp(!)  for all ! 2 
. (6)
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Each rm takes aggregate output of nal goods X as given and so it perceives a constant elasticity
of demand,  . As is usual in such settings, the prot-maximizing rm applies a xed percentage
markup to its unit cost.
Considering the optimal hiring decision, a rm that operates a technology ' has produc-
tivity  [';m (')] and pays a wage w [m (')]. Hence, the rm faces a minimal unit cost of
w [m (')] = [';m (')]. The rms prot-maximizing price is given by10
p (') =


   1

w [m (')]
 [';m (')]
. (7)
This yields an operating prot of
 (') =   (   1) ( 1)X

w [m (')]
 [';m (')]
1 
. (8)
2.3 Inventing New Varieties
An entrepreneur can develop a new variety of intermediate input at any time. As in Romer (1990),
we treat R&D as an up-front, xed cost. The productivity of labor in the R&D activity depends
on the ability of the research worker and the state of knowledge in the economy. We measure the
knowledge stock at time t by KMt, where Mt is the mass of varieties that have been developed
before time t and K is a parameter that reects how e¤ectively the economy converts cumulative
research experience into applicable knowledge.
Consider `R (a) workers with abilities in the interval [a; a+ da] who engage in research when
the stock of knowledge is KM . These workers expand the set of available varieties by dM =
KMT (a) `R (a) da per unit time, where T (a) is an increasing function that captures how worker
ability translates into R&D productivity. In equilibrium, the set LR of worker types performs the
research function, with density `R (a). Then growth in the measure of varieties is given by
gM = KN
Z
a2LR
T (a) `R (a) da, (9)
where gM = _M=M .
Each invention generates a technology for producing a new variety. As in Melitz (2003), we
assume that entrepreneurs learn their technology only after the good is invented. Beforehand,
they perceive that ' will be drawn from a cumulative distribution function G (') that is strictly
increasing and twice continuously di¤erentiable on the bounded support ['min; 'max].
Entrepreneurs can enter freely into R&D. Entry at time t generates a draw from the technology
distribution G (') and then a stream of operating prots,  (') for   t. On a balanced-growth
path, wages of all types of workers grow at the common rate gw and nal output grows at a constant
rate gX . Final output serves only consumption, so, by (2), gX =   . Operating prots also grow
10We henceforth index intermediate goods by the technology with which they are produced (') rather than their
variety name (!), since all varieties are symmetric except for their di¤erent technologies.
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at a constant rate g, independent of ', and, by (8), g = gX   (   1) gw. Finally, (4) and
(7) imply that, in a steady state, (   1) gw = gM . Combining these long-run relationships, the
expected discounted prots for a new entrant at time t can be written as
Z 1
t
e ( t)
Z 'max
'min
 (') dG (') d =
R 'max
'min
t (') dG (')
+ gM
.
With free entry, this must equal the cost of developing a new variety, w (a) =T (a) KMt for any
a 2 LR. We again drop the time subscript and write the steady-state free-entry condition asR 'max
'min
 (') dG (')
+ gM
=
w (a)
T (a) KM
for all a 2 LR. (10)
2.4 Sorting, Matching, and Labor-Market Equilibrium
Individuals gain employment in either research or manufacturing. We assume that high-ability
individuals enjoy a comparative advantage in R&D. In particular, we adopt
Assumption 2 The ratio T (a) = ('; a) is increasing in a for all ' 2 ['min; 'max] and all a 2
[amin; amax].
As we shall see in a moment, this assumption su¢ ces to ensure that, in an equilibrium with positive
growth, all of the best workers with a greater than some aR engage in R&D, while the remaining
workers with a less than aR manufacture intermediate goods.
Consider the competitive wages paid to any set of workers employed in the manufacturing sector.
In equilibrium, these wages must be such that the rm with productivity ' is willing to hire the
worker with ability m (') and does not prefer to hire instead a di¤erent worker. In other words,
the wage function must be such that prots are maximized for a rm of type ' when it chooses the
worker of type m ('). From the rst-order condition for cost minimization, we have11
Lemma 1 Consider any closed interval of workers [a0; a00] that is employed in the manufacturing
sector in equilibrium. In the interior of this interval, the wage schedule must satisfy
w0 (a)
w (a)
=
 a

m 1 (a) ; a

 [m 1 (a) ; a]
for all a 2  a0; a00 ; (11)
where m 1 () is the inverse of m ().
Similarly, the entrepreneurs engaged in R&D must be willing to hire all of the workers employed
there. Potential entrepreneurs are homogeneous, so full employment requires that wages rise with
productivity in research, i.e.,
11The cost-minimization problem for a rm with productivity ' is to minimize w (a) = ('; a). See also Sampson
(2013) for further discussion and use of this wage formula.
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Lemma 2 Consider any closed interval of workers [a0; a00] that is employed in the R&D sector in
equilibrium. In the interior of this interval, the wage schedule must satisfy
w0 (a)
w (a)
=
T 0 (a)
T (a)
for all a 2  a0; a00 :
To secure full employment at all ability levels, the wage function must be continuous on [amin; amax].
Now suppose that an ability level aR is a cuto¤point such that an interval of workers with
abilities just below aR works in one sector (i.e., manufacturing or R&D) while an interval of workers
with abilities just above aR works in the other. First note that the wage schedule w (a) must
be continuous at any such aR; otherwise a rm that hires individuals with ability just above
aR could save discretely by hiring slightly less able workers while sacricing only marginally in
the productivity of its workforce. Next, suppose that the workers with abilities in an interval
[a0; aR) are employed in R&D whereas those with abilities in the interval (aR; a00] are employed
in manufacturing, for some a0 < aR < a00. Considering the shape of the wage schedule dictated
by Lemma 1, if Assumption 2 is satised, an entrepreneur could hire workers with ability slightly
greater than aR to conduct research and would capture strictly positive expected prots.12 Of
course, this is not possible in equilibrium, so the workers to the right of any cuto¤ point must in
fact be employed in R&D, not in manufacturing. In short, we have
Lemma 3 In any equilibrium with positive growth, all workers with type a 2 [amin; aR) are em-
ployed in the manufacturing sector and all workers with type a 2 (aR; amax] are employed in the
R&D sector, for some aR 2 (amin; amax).
Now that we know which workers are employed in each sector, we can derive a di¤erential
equation for the matching function in manufacturing by equating the supply of workers in some
bottom interval of ability levels to the demand for workers by all rms that hire these workers. We
express this condition in terms of the wage bill paid and received by employees of all rms with a
12A rm that hires the marginal researchers with ability aR to conduct R&D pays a cost cR(aR) per innovation,
where cR (aR) = w (aR) =KMT (aR). If the rm were instead to hire slightly better researchers, the proportional
change in its cost per innovation would be
c0R(aR)
cR (aR)
=
w0 (aR)
w (aR)
  T
0 (aR)
T (aR)
.
Since we have hypothesized that individuals with a 2 [aR; a00] are employed in manufacturing, the wage prole in this
range is guided by Lemma 1. Accordingly,
c0R(aR)
cR (aR)
=
 a

m 1 (aR) ; aR

 [m 1 (aR) ; aR]
  T
0 (aR)
T (aR)
< 0 ,
where the inequality follows directly from Assumption 2.
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technology index less than or equal to ', namely13
MX


   1
  Z '
'min

w [m ()]
 [;m ()]
1 
dG () = N
Z m(')
amin
w (a) dH (a) . (12)
Di¤erentiating this equation yields
m0 (') =
MX
N


   1
  w [m (')] 
 [';m (')]1 
G0 (')
H 0 [m (')]
for all ' 2 ['min; 'max] : (13)
We know from Grossman et al. (2013) that, given aR, this equation together with the wage equation
(11) applied for a 2 [amin; aR] and the boundary conditions
m ('min) = amin; m ('max) = aR (14)
uniquely determine the matching function and the wage function for workers in manufacturing.14
To emphasize the dependence of matching on the identity of the marginal worker, we will sometimes
write the matching function as m ('; aR). Note that matching depends on the properties of the
labor productivity function  (), the distribution functions of rm and worker types G () and
H (), and the elasticity of substitution , because these features of the economic environment
enter the di¤erential equations. Matching does not depend directly on other parameters of the
model, although these parameters can a¤ect matching indirectly, if they alter the cuto¤ aR. It is
also clear that MX=N , which appears in (13), has no a¤ect on matching; rather, changes in this
measure of the size of the economy shift the wage function proportionately. This last point becomes
particularly clear following di¤erentiation of (13) and the derivation of a second-order di¤erential
equation for the matching function,
m00 (')
m0 (')
= (   1)  ' [';m (')]
 [';m (')]
   a [';m (')]m
0 (')
 [';m (')]
+
G00 (')
G0 (')
  H
00 [m (')]m0 (')
H 0 [m (')]
; (15)
which is independent of MX=N , as are the boundary conditions. This second order di¤erential
equation will prove useful in parts of the analysis below.
The solid curve in Figure 3 depicts the qualitative features of an equilibrium matching func-
tion for given aR. The least productive rms, with technology parameter 'min; employ the least
able workers, with ability level amin. The most productive rms, with technology parameter 'max;
employ the manufacturing sectors most able workers, with ability level aR. Finally, the func-
13By (5), (6), and (7), a rm with productivity  employs
` () =
X
h

 1w [m ()]
i 
 [;m ()]1 
workers. Therefore, the left-hand side of (12) gives the aggregate wage bill paid by all rms with technology parameter
less than or equal to '. The right-hand side of (12) is the aggregate wage income of workers with ability less than or
equal to m (')
14For further discussion of uniqueness of this solution, see Appendix A2.4.
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Figure 3: Matching function
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tion is continuous and monotonically increasing due to the complementarity between abilities and
technologies. Now compare this matching function to one that emerges when the ability cuto¤
is higher, say a0R > aR. The matching function m ('; a
0
R) is depicted by the broken curve in the
gure. In Grossman et al. (2013) we establish that the pair of solutions to (11) and (13) that
apply for di¤erent boundary conditions can intersect at most once.15 But since the curves must
intersect at the common lower boundary point, they cannot intersect again. It follows that when
the manufacturing expands by an increase in aR, every worker originally in the sector matches with
a less productive rm than before, while every rm upgrades its workforce. This feature plays a
key role in shaping wage inequality in manufacturing.
2.5 The Balanced-Growth Path
Equation (9) gives a relationship between the steady-state growth rate in the number of varieties and
the set of resources allocated to R&D. Now that we know that the workforce in research comprises
all workers with ability above aR and only those workers. So, we can rewrite the equation as
gM = KN
Z amax
aR
T (a) dH (a) . (16)
The curve RR in Figure 4 depicts this relationship between gM and aR. The curve which falls
entirely in the positive quadrant shows that faster growth in the number of varieties requires
greater resources devoted to R&D and therefore a lower cuto¤ ability level for the marginal research
worker.
We can derive a second long-run relationship between gM and aR using the labor-market clearing
condition (12) and the long-run free entry condition, (10). First note that, given the ability cuto¤
aR and the matching function m ('; aR), the wage equation (11) in Lemma 1 allows us to compute
15For further discussion, see also Appendix A2.4.
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Figure 4: Equilibrum growth rate and ability cuto¤
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the wage of any worker in manufacturing relative to the wage of the least able worker. That is,
ln (a; aR) =
Z a
amin
 a

m 1 (; aR) ; 

 [m 1 (; aR) ; ]
d for all a 2 [amin; aR] ; (17)
where  (a; aR)  w (a) =w(amin). We emphasize, with the notation for  (a; aR), that this ratio
depends only on aR and the parameters that a¤ect the di¤erential equation (15) for the matching
function. Using (17), along with (10), (12) and the continuity of the wage function at aR, we derive
in Appendix A2.5 the following relationship between the long-run growth rate and the ability cuto¤:
+ gM = KN (aR) (18)
where
 (aR)  T (aR)
(   1) (aR; aR)
Z aR
amin
 (a; aR) dH (a) .
The AA curve in Figure 4 illustrates this second relationship between gM and aR. The fact that it
is everywhere upward sloping also is established in the appendix.
The gure shows a unique balanced-growth equilibrium at point E.16 Once we know the long-
run rate of growth in the number of intermediate goods, we can calculate the growth in consumption
and wages from gw = gc = gM= (   1).17 Once we know the steady-state cuto¤ level of ability aR,
we can compute the long-run distribution of relative wages (and incomes) using the wage structures
dictated by Lemmas 1 and 2.
16 If the AA curve falls below the horizontal axis for all aR  amax, then no workers are employed in the research
sector in the steady state. In such circumstances, growth rates of varieties, nal output, consumption and wages are
all zero.
17Consumption grows in the long run at the rate of income, and wages are the sole source of income, because in
the steady state the ow of operating prots just covers R&D costs.
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2.6 Measuring Inequality
Before proceeding to analyze the determinants of long-run growth and income distribution in the
closed economy, we conclude this section with a brief discussion about wage inequality and the size
distribution of rms. We shall focus on measures of wage inequality such as the Theil index, the
Atkinson index and Lorenz-curve dominance that are scale invariant (i.e., they are homogeneous of
degree zero in all wages) and that respect second-order stochastic dominance. When comparing two
wage distributions, we will say that one is strictly more unequal than the other if an appropriate
proportional scaling of the former yields a distribution that is a mean-preserving spread of the
latter. More formally, we rst describe inequality among a limited range of workers with abilities
in the interval [a0; a00]  [amin;amax] : We propose
Denition 1 Let w (a) and ~w (a) be continuous and increasing wage functions. The distribution
of w has strictly greater inequality than the distribution of ~w on the interval [a0; a00] if there
exists a scalar  > 0 such that w (a) 6= ~w (a) for some a 2 [a0; a00] and the conditional distribution
of w is a mean-preserving spread of the conditional distribution of ~w.
If the wages w (a) happen to be proportional to the wages ~w (a) for all a 2 [a0; a00], we will say that
the two distributions have equal inequality in the interval.
Next, we turn to the full wage distribution. We rank inequality in two di¤erent distributions
as follows.
Denition 2 Let w (a) and ~w (a) be continuous and increasing wage functions on [amin; amax]. The
distribution of w is everywhere more unequal than the distribution of ~w if for every partition
of [amin; amax] the conditional distribution of w has equal or strictly greater inequality than the
conditional distribution of ~w on every subinterval of this partition, and strictly greater inequality
on at least one such subinterval.
To make comparisons of wage inequality both within and between countries, it will prove useful
to rely on the single-crossing property of the mean-adjusted wage functions. That is, we shall apply
Lemma 4 Let w (a) and ~w (a) be continuous and increasing wage functions on [a0; a00] and choose
 such that the means of the conditional distributions of w and ~w are the same. If there exists an
a 2 (a0; a00) such that w (a) < ~w (a) for all a 2 [a0; a) and w (a) > ~w (a) for all a 2 (a; a00], then
the conditional distribution of w has strictly greater inequality than the conditional distribution of
~w.
The lemma follows immediately from the fact that the single-crossing property ensures that w (a) is
a mean-preserving spread of ~w (a). If we can establish a single-crossing property for mean-adjusted
wage distributions, this su¢ ces to allow a ranking of the distributions in terms of their inequality.
We show next how wage inequality within the manufacturing sector reects the cuto¤ ability
level, aR. We have seen already in (17) that the ratio of the wage of any worker in the manufacturing
15
Figure 5: Relative wages
sector relative to that of the least-able worker is uniquely determined by aR. Moreover, Figure 3 has
been used to illustrate that an increase in aR causes all workers originally in manufacturing to match
with less productive rms than before. The downgrade in technology harms the productivity of all
of these workers, but due to the complementarity between ability and technology it especially
harms those with relatively greater ability. In other words, we have18
Lemma 5 Suppose amax  a0R > aR > amin. Then
 (a00; aR)
 (a0; aR)
>
 (a00; a0R)

 
a0; a0R
 for all a00 > a0 and a0; a00 2 [amin; aR] .
Lemma 5 states that the relative-wage function  () is log submodular in the ability of a worker
and the ability cuto¤ level. Intuitively, relative wages behave like relative productivities, and since
the cuto¤ level aR inversely a¤ects the technology match for every worker, the function  (a; aR)
inherits the opposite properties as  (a; '). Note that since  (amin,aR) =  (amin,a0R) = 1, the
lemma also implies that  (a; aR) >  (a; a0R) for all a 2 (amin; aR). In words, an increase in the
cuto¤ level shifts the relative-wage function for manufacturing downward.
The solid curve in Figure 5 depicts the relative wage structure (in logs) for an economy in which
the cuto¤ ability level is aR. To the left of aR, ln [w (a) =w (amin)] = ln (a; aR), where ln (a; aR)
can be calculated using (17). The curve rises with slope  a

m 1 (a; aR) ; a

= 

m 1 (a; aR) ; a

in
this range. To the right of aR, ln [w (a) =w (amin)] = ln [T (a) (aR; aR) =T (aR)], and the curve rises
with slope T 0 (a) =T (a). By Assumption 2, the wage schedule becomes steeper at the cuto¤ point,
labelled 1.
18By Assumption 1, a deterioration in the match for the worker with ability a reduces the expression under the
integral in (17). It therefore reduces the relative wage of the worker with greater ability among any pair of workers
in manufacturing.
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Now consider an increase in the cuto¤ point, to a0R > aR. In Figure 5, the log of the new
relative wage structure is depicted by the dotted curve. By Lemma 5, the dotted curve must be
atter than the solid curve for all ability levels a < aR. For a > a0R the slopes of the two curves
are the same, namely T 0 (a) =T (a). Finally, Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that the dotted curve is
atter than the solid curve for all a 2 (aR; a0R).19
These observations allow us to draw a number of conclusions about the relationship between the
size of the manufacturing sector and wage inequality. First, when aR rises to a0R (i.e., employment
in manufacturing grows at the expense of R&D), wage inequality falls among any range of workers
[a0; a00]  [amin; a0R]. This follows from Lemma 4 and the fact that the ex ante and ex post mean-
adjusted wage functions cross only once. Second, wage inequality remains the same after an increase
in aR for every interval of workers [a0; a00]  [a0R; amax]. It follows, from Denition 2 that, other
things equal, expansion of the manufacturing sector reduces wage inequality everywhere. More
formally, we record
Lemma 6 Suppose aR; a0R 2 [amin; amax] ; with a0R > aR. Then the wage function w (a; aR) is
everywhere more unequal than the wage function w (a; a0R).
Finally, we note that the rematching of workers to rms that results from a change in the size
and composition of the manufacturing sector has implications as well for the size distribution of
rms. When the matches deteriorate for workers, as they do when the cuto¤ point for employment
in manufacturing rises from aR to a0R and the distribution of technologies G (') remains the same,
the matches improve for the rms that hire these workers. This rematching raises productivity for
all rms, but especially so for those with more sophisticated technologies (as indexed by '). Since
the more productive rms gain the most in terms of either sales or revenues, the size distribution
of rms widens. This gives us20
19Note that the slope of the solid curve in this range is T 0 (a) =T (a), whereas the slope of the dotted curve is
w0 (a; a0R) =w (a; a
0
R) = a (a; a
0
R) = (a; a
0
R) =  a

m 1 (a; a0R) ; a

= 

m 1 (a; a0R) ; a

, by the denition of the relative-
wage function  () and the wage equation (11). Assumption 2 implies
 a

m 1 (a; a0R) ; a

 [m 1 (a; a0R) ; a]
<
T 0 (a)
T (a)
for a < a0R.
20Using the expression for ` (') from footnote 13, the volume of output of a rm with technology ' is
x (') =  [';m (')] ` (') =
X
h

 1w [m (')]
i 
 [';m (')] 
;
and, using (7), its revenue is
r (') = p (')x (') =
X
h

 1w [m (')]
i1 
 [';m (')]1 
:
Equation (11) then implies that
lnx ('2)  lnx ('1) = 
Z '2
'1
 ' [';m (')]
 [';m (')]
d' for all '1; '2 2 ['min; 'max] ;
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Lemma 7 Suppose aR; a0R 2 [amin; amax] ; with a0R > aR. If the distribution of technologies G (')
is the same, then the size distribution of rm output and rm revenue is more unequal whenthe
cuto¤ ability level is a0R than when it is aR.
Lemma 7 implies that, as long as the distribution of technologies does not change, changes in the
size distribution of rms are opposite to changes in wage inequality among manufacturing workers.
We will not record all of the implications for the rm size distribution below, but we note that they
apply to all comparative statics except for those in Section 3.4 and 4.5.
3 Growth and Inequality in Autarky Equilibrium
In this section, we compare growth rates and inequality measures in a pair of closed economies.
We consider countries i and j that are basically similar but di¤er in some technological or policy
parameters. We focus on balanced-growth equilibria as described in Section 2. In the next section,
we will perform similar cross-country comparisons for a set of open economies and examine how
the opening of trade a¤ects growth and inequality around the globe.
3.1 Productivity in Manufacturing
We begin by supposing that the countries di¤er only in their productivity in manufacturing, as
captured by a Hicks-neutral technology parameter  . In country c, a unit of labor of type a
applied in a rm with technology ' can produce  c ('; a) =  c ('; a) units of a di¤erentiated
intermediate good. For the time being, the other characteristics of the countries are the same,
including their sizes, their distributions of ability, their distributions of rm productivity, their
discount rates and the e¢ ciency of their knowledge accumulation.
In these circumstances, the matching function m ('; aR) that satises (15) is common to both
countries; i.e., a di¤erence between  i and  j does not a¤ect matching in the manufacturing
sector for a given aR. Therefore, the relative-wage function  (a; aR) also will be the same in both
countries if they have the same cuto¤ point, as can be seen clearly from (17). But then the solution
to (16) and (18) is the same for any values of  i and  j . In other words, countries that di¤er only
in the (Hicks-neutral) productivity of their manufacturing sectors share the same long-run growth
rate and the same marginal worker in manufacturing. It follows that their wage distributions
as reected by w (a; aR) =w (amin; aR) are also the same for all a 2 [amin; amax]. Hicks-neutral
di¤erences in manufacturing productivity do not generate long-run di¤erences in autarky growth
rates or income distribution, although they do a¤ect income levels. We summarize in
Proposition 1 Suppose that countries i and j di¤er only in manufacturing labor productivity  c ()
and that these di¤erences are Hicks-neutral; i.e.,  c () =  c () for c = i; j. Then in autarky,
and
ln r ('2)  ln r ('1) = (   1)
Z '2
'1
 ' [';m (')]
 [';m (')]
d' for all '1; '2 2 ['min; 'max] :
It follows from Assumption 1 that  '= rises when m (') increases at all '.
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both countries grow at the same rate in a balanced-growth equilibrium and both share the same
structure of relative wages and the same degree of income inequality.
3.2 Capacity to Innovate
In our model, a countrys capacity for innovation is described by three parameters: size, which
determines the potential scale of the research activity; the productivity of research workers of a
given ability level; and the e¢ ciency with which research experience is converted into knowledge
capital. In this section, we compare autarky growth rates and income distributions in countries
that di¤er in labor force, Nc, in e¢ ciency of knowledge accumulation, Kc, and in the productivity
of research workers, as captured by a Hicks-neutral shift parameter Tc, where Tc (a) = TcT (a).
The RR curve in Figure 4 is described by equation (16). In this equation, the aforementioned
parameters enter as a product; i.e., the right-hand side of the equation is proportional to KcNcTc,
for given aR and a common T (a) schedule. The same product also enters into equation (18) for the
AA curve. Here, the relative-wage function  (a; aR) appears under the integral. However, none
of the three parameters under consideration enters into the second-order di¤erential equation (15)
that determines the the matching function for given aR, and therefore none a¤ects the relative wage
function  (a; aR) for given aR. It follows that the right-hand side of (18) also is proportional to
KcNcTc, for given aR. In turn, this implies that KcNcTc is a su¢ cient statistic for the innovation
capacity in country c; variation in this product explains cross-country variation in (autarky) long-
run growth rates and income distribution, all else the same.
Now consider two countries i and j that di¤er in innovation capacity such that KiNiTi >
KjNjTj . Under these circumstances, the AA and RR curves for country i lie above those for
country j. But relative to the equilibrium cuto¤ point aRj in country j, the AA curve in country
i passes above the RR curve in that country.21 It follows that the equilibrium point for country i
lies above and to the left of that for country j; i.e., country i devotes more resources to R&D and
grows faster in the long run.
What are the implications for the comparison of the two wage distributions? By Lemma 6,
we know that wages are more equally distributed in country j, where the range of ability levels
allocated to manufacturing is larger. The faster growing country has a greater share of workers in
R&D and thus a less able set of workers in its manufacturing sector compared to the slower growing
country. As a result, each manufacturing worker in country i is paired with a better technology than
his counterpart of similar ability in country j. This favors especially the more able manufacturing
workers in country i, due to the complementarity between ability and technology. It follows that
for any two ability levels employed in manufacturing in both countries, the relative wage of the
more able in the pair is higher in country i than in country j. The allocation of a greater share
of workers to research in country i compared to country j further contributes to its greater wage
inequality, inasmuch as wages rise more rapidly with ability in the R&D sector than they do in
21An increase in KNT shifts the RR curve up proportionately, but it shts the AA curve up more than propopor-
tionately.
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manufacturing.
We summarize these ndings in
Proposition 2 Suppose that countries i and j di¤er only in their capacity for innovation and that
KiNiTi > KjNjTj. Then, in autarky, country i grows faster in a balanced-growth equilibrium
than country j and it has everywhere a more unequal wage distribution.
Note that a country with a large population may have a low capacity for innovation, if its
workers are not very productive in the research sector or if (for institutional or other reasons)
it does not convert research experience into knowledge capital very e¢ ciently. But whatever the
source of a countrys innovation capacity, the larger is its capacity to conduct R&D the faster will
be its long-run growth in autarky and the more unequal will be its distribution of earnings.
3.3 Support for R&D
Next we examine the role that research policy plays in shaping growth and inequality, focusing
specically on cross-country di¤erences in R&D subsidies. We consider symmetric countries i and
j that di¤er only in their subsidy rates, si and sj . In each country, the subsidy is nanced by
a proportional tax on wages.22 With a subsidy in place, a research rm in country c pays a
cost (1  sc)wc (a) =T (a) KMc to invent a new variety when it hires researchers with ability a.
Accordingly, the free-entry condition that gives rise to the AA curve in Figure 4 is replaced by
(1  sc) (+ gMc) = KN (aRc) .
Neither equation (16) that relates growth to resources invested in R&D, nor the RR curve that
depicts this relationship, is a¤ected by the subsidy.
It follows immediately that, if si > sj , the AA curve for country i rests above and to the left of
that for country j. Not surprisingly, the subsidy draws labor into the research sector and, thereby,
stimulates growth. The link to the income distribution should also be clear by now. With aRi < aRj ,
the technology matches are better for manufacturing workers of a given ability in country i than
in country j, which generates a more unequal distribution of wages. The larger size of the research
sector in country i also contributes to its greater inequality, because ability is more amply rewarded
in R&D than in manufacturing. In short, the country with the larger R&D subsidy experiences
greater wage inequality.
Proposition 3 Suppose that countries i and j di¤er only in their R&D subsidies and that si > sj.
Then, in autarky, country i grows faster in a balanced-growth equilibrium than country j and it has
everywhere a more unequal wage distribution.
22Such a proportional levy leaves the after-tax distribution of income the same as the pre-tax distribution and,
because labor is supplied inelastically, it has no e¤ect on resource allocation.
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Figure 6: Matching for di¤erent values of 'c
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In Section 4.4, we will revisit the e¤ects of R&D subsidies for an open economy and will address the
spillover e¤ects of such subsidies on growth and inequality in a countrys trading partners. We will
see that R&D subsidies increase inequality not only at home, but ubiquitously around the globe.
3.4 Manufacturing Technologies
Recall that an inventor draws a technology ' from a set of possible technologies for producing
intermediate goods according to the distribution function G (). Countries may di¤er in the set
of technologies that their inventors can access. To explore how such di¤erences a¤ect growth and
inequality, we take Gc (') to be a truncated Pareto distribution with domain ['min; 'c] for c = i; j
and 'i > 'j . The countries otherwise are alike including in the shapes of their technology
distributions.23
Specically, let
Gc (') =
' kmin   ' k
' kmin   ' kc
for all ' 2 ['min; 'c] , c = i; j, k > 2:
Here, k is the shape parameter, common to the two countries. With this formulation, the tech-
nological possibilities facing inventors in country i rst-order stochastically dominate those facing
inventors in country j.24
Note that G00c (') =G0c (') is independent of c in the overlapping range of '. The other terms in
the second-order di¤erential equation (15) for the matching function in country c are common in
23We adopt a truncated Pareto distribution to parmaterize G (), because there are no sharp results for arbitrary
di¤erences in the technology sets, even if the draws in one country rst-order stochastically dominate those in the
other.
24We could also allow for cross-country di¤erences in the lower bound of the productivity distribution, 'min. As
long as the ordering of the lower bounds is the same as that of the upper bounds, our results would be the same. We
assume a common lower bound in order to simplify the exposition.
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the two countries as well. It follows that di¤erences in matching between workers and technologies
arise only because the boundary conditions (14) are di¤erent in the two countries, and not because
the solutions for the matching functions take di¤erent forms.25 To emphasize this point, we write
the matching function for country c as m ('; aRc; 'c) for c = i; j.
The inverse-matching functions for the two countries commence at the same point (amin; 'min),
as depicted in Figure 6. Since they can intersect only once, the (dotted) curve for country i would
need to lie to the left of the (solid) curve for country j if the ranges of ability levels allocated
to manufacturing in the two countries happened to be the same. In other words, m ('; aR; 'i) <
m
 
'; aR; 'j

for all ' 2 ('min; 'j ]. This means that a worker of given ability would nd a better
technology match in country i than in country j if the ability of the marginal worker were the
same, thanks to the fact that country i makes use of a strictly superior mix of technologies. In
turn, this implies that  (a; aR; 'i) > 
 
a; aR; 'j

for all a 2 (amin; aR]; the complementarity
between ability and technology would give rise to a higher relative wage for a worker of any ability
a > amin (compared to the wage of the least able worker) in the country with the better technology
draws. For a similar reason, the relative wage of a worker of any ability a < aR compared to the
wage of the worker with ability aR would be lower in country i than in country j if the cuto¤ ability
levels were the same; i.e.,  (a; aR; 'i) = (aR; aR; 'i) > 
 
a; aR; 'j

=
 
aR; aR; 'j

.
This last observation implies that the AA curve for country i lies below that for country j. To
see this, note the equation for the AA curve (18) and the fact that
 (aR; 'c) 
T (aR)
(   1)
Z aR
amin
 (a; aR; 'c)
 (aR; aR; 'c)
dH (a) :
It follows that  (aR; 'i) < 
 
aR; 'j

. However, the RR curve is the same in the two countries inas-
much as the production technology set does not a¤ect the relationship between the labor allocated
to R&D and the resulting growth rate of the number of varieties. We conclude that gMi < gMj
and that aRi > aRj . Intuitively, we nd that among two countries that are otherwise similar, the
one that draws from a better set of technologies for producing intermediate goods devotes more
resources to manufacturing and less to innovation.
Now we are ready to compare the equilibrium wage distributions in the two countries. There
are two o¤setting forces. On the one hand, the superior mix of technologies alone would make the
matches for manufacturing workers in country i better than those for their counterparts in country
j; if the same set of worker types happened to sort into manufacturing in the two countries. On the
other hand, we have just seen that a wider range of workers sorts into manufacturing in country
i than in country j, and since the marginal workers in the sector are better than the average, a
worker of a given ability level nds it more di¢ cult to match with a good rm due to the greater
competition in the labor market. The apparent ambiguity can be seen in Figure 6; depending on
the distance between aRi and aRj , it appears that the inverse-matching curve for country i, which
25 In other words, in the solution to the di¤erential equations (11) and (13) for given boundary conditions, the value
of 'c impacts the level of wages, but not the resulting matches between worker types and technologies.
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Figure 7: Relative wages in countries i and j, when 'i > 'j
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extends from (amin; 'min) to a point such as ei, could lie above or below that for country j, which
extends from the same starting point to point ej .
The ambiguity is only apparent, however. We nd that the better matching that is associated
with a superior technology set can never be fully (or more than fully) o¤set by the endogenous
response of the composition of workers in the sector.26 In other words, the inverse-matching function
for country i must lie above the inverse-matching function for country j, even after the di¤erence
between aRi and aRj has been taken into account. In the new equilibrium, all worker types a 2
(amin; aRj ] nd better technology matches in country i than in country j. This generates strictly
greater wage inequality among workers with abilities in this range.
Figure 7 depicts (log) relative wages in the two countries, including workers employed in both
the manufacturing and research sectors. For a > aRi, the two curves have the same slopes, because
wages of research workers rise at the same rate in both countries as a reection of their common
research productivities. For a < aRj , relative wages rise faster with ability in country i than
in country j, because workers there achieve better technological matches than their counterparts
and productivity in manufacturing is log supermodular in technology and ability. Finally, for a 2
(aRj ; aRi), wages rise more rapidly with ability in country j than in country i, because these ability
levels are allocated to R&D in j, but to manufacturing in i, and by Assumption 2, productivity is
26 Inasmuch as gMi < gMj ,
+ gMi < + gMj = KN
 
aRj ; 'j

=
KNT (aRj)
(   1)  aRj ; aRj ; 'j
Z aRj
amin

 
a; aRj ; 'j

dH (a) :
Now suppose it were the case that m
 
'; aRj ; 'j

< m ('; aRi; 'i) for all ' 2
 
'min; 'j

. Then

 
a; aRj ; 'j

=
 
aRj ; aRj ; 'j

<  (a; aRi; 'i) = (aRj ; aRi; 'i) for all a 2 (amin; aRj ], which would imply that
+ gMi < + gMj = KN
 
aRj ; 'j

<
KNT (aRj)
(   1) (aRj ; aRi; 'i)
Z aRj
amin
 (a; aRi; 'i) dH (a) :
The expression on the far right-hand side of this inequality chain is rising in aRj by Lemma 2, and thus it implies
+ gMi < KN (aRi; 'i). But this contradicts condition (18) for country i.
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more responsive to ability in research than in manufacturing.
What then can we say about the comparison of income distributions in the two countries? Our
analysis suggests that the wage distribution is strictly more unequal in the country with the better
manufacturing technologies at the bottom end of the wage distribution, but that the opposite is
true at the top end of the distribution. For the entire earnings structure, the two wage distributions
cannot be unambiguously ranked. We collect our ndings in
Proposition 4 Suppose that countries i and j di¤er only in their distributions of manufacturing
technologies, that Gc (') is a truncated Pareto distribution with shape k and range ['min; 'c] in
country c, and that 'i > 'j. Then, in autarky: (i) gMi < gMj; (ii) the wage distribution is
strictly more unequal in i than in j for any interval [a0; a00]  [amin; aRj ]; (iii) the wage distribution
is weakly more unequal in j than in i for any interval [a0; a00]  [aRj ; amax]; (iv) there exists an
intermediate range of abilities [a; a]  [aRj ; aRi] such that for a 2 [a; a], wi (a) =wi (amin) >
wj (a) =wj (amin) and wi (a) =wi (amax) > wj (a) =wj (amax).
Proposition 4 raises two interesting possibilities. First, the cross-country correlation between
growth rates and measures of income inequality need not be positive. Cross-country di¤erences
in innovation capacity or in R&D subsidies do generally indicate such a positive correlation in
our model, but the correlations that arise when countries di¤er in their technology draws can go
either way and presumably will depend upon the exact measure of inequality inasmuch as the
various measures weigh di¤erently the di¤erent segments of the wage distribution. Second, the
cross-country results can also be interpreted in terms of comparative statics for a single country.
With this interpretation, an increase in ' induces a growth slowdown together with an increase in
the relative wages of middle-ability workers compared to those at either extreme.
4 Growth and Inequality in a Trading Equilibrium
In this section, we introduce international trade among a set of countries that di¤er in size, in
research productivity, in manufacturing technologies, in capacity to create and absorb international
knowledge spillovers, and in their innovation and trade policies. First, we examine the e¤ects of
trade on growth and income inequality in a typical country. Then, we allow countries to di¤er along
one dimension at a time and ask how each di¤erence is reected in the cross-country comparison of
their income distributions. We also explore the spillover e¤ects of policies and parameters in one
country on growth and income inequality in its trading partners.
Our trading environment has C countries indexed by c = 1; : : : ; C. In country c, there are Nc
workers with a distribution of abilities, H (a).27 A worker with ability a who applies a technology
27By assuming that the distribution of worker types is common to the countries, we neglect how di¤erences in
factor composition such as those emphasized in Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch.7) interact with factor intensities
to inuence the e¤ects of trade on a countrys long-run growth. Note too that we have only one manufacturing
sector and one primary factor of production (albeit, a heterogeneous factor), whereas Grossman and Helpman (1991)
typically studied economies with two primary factors and two sectors that di¤er in factor intensity. See Grossman et
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' in country c can produce  c ('; a) units of any intermediate good, where  ('; a) again has
the complementarity properties described by Assumption 1 and  c is, as before, a parameter that
allows for Hicks-neutral productivity di¤erences in the manufacturing sector across countries. In
the research sector, a worker with ability a has potential productivity TcT (a)Kc, where Tc reects
the research productivity of workers of a given type in country c and Kc is the national stock of
knowledge capital, about which we will have more to say in a moment.
To ease the exposition, we will assume except in Section 4.5 that inventors in all countries draw
manufacturing technologies from a common distribution G ('). Note, however, that Proposition
5 below that compares the growth rate and income inequality in a trade equilibrium to those in
a countrys autarky equilibrium would apply as well to a trading environment in which inventors
worldwide face truncated Pareto distributions of possible technology outcomes with a common
shape parameter, but with di¤erent bounds in each country.
We suppose that the government in country c subsidizes the invention of new varieties of inter-
mediate goods at rate sc. All existing varieties of such goods are internationally tradable subject to
trading frictions. We model these frictions as a combination of iceberg trading costs and ad valorem
tari¤s, so that the delivered price of any intermediate good imported from country j and delivered
in country c is  jc times as great as the price received by the exporter in the source country. The
budget decit (or surplus) generated by the R&D subsidies net of tari¤ revenue is nanced (or
redistributed) by a proportional tax (or subsidy) on wages.
Final goods are assumed to be nontradable.28 Let qc represent the price of the nal good in
country c, pjc (!) the price there of variety ! of an intermediate good imported from country j,
and 
j the set of intermediate goods produced in country j. Competitive pricing of nal goods
implies that 8<:
CX
j=1
"Z
!2
j
pjc (!)
1  d!
#9=;
1
1 
= qc ;
while the choice of numeraire allows us to set any one of these prices equal to one. We denote by
Xc the output of nal goods in country c.
We describe now the di¤erences in national knowledge stocks and in countriesabilities to apply
knowledge capital in the R&D process. As is well known from the literature on endogenous growth
in the open economy (see, for example, Grossman and Helpman, 1991), the extent of international
knowledge spillover plays an important role in determining the e¤ects of trade on long-run growth.
The evidence surveyed by Helpman (2004, ch.5) points to the existence of signicant but incomplete
international R&D spillovers. Coe et al. (2009) nd, for example, that a countrys researchers
benet di¤erentially from domestic and foreign R&D experience and that the capacity to absorb
al. (2013) for a static analysis of the interplay between factor heterogeneity and sectoral factor intensities in shaping
factor rewards.
28Our results concerning the e¤ects of trade on growth and inequality and the spillover e¤ects of policy would also
apply if the nal good were freely traded. However, in such circumstances, the nal good would only be produced
in the country (or countries) with the minimum cost of producing these goods as determined by aggregating the
domestic prices of the various domestic and imported intermediates.
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domestic and foreign knowledge depends on a countrys institutions and in particular on its regime
for protection of intellectual property rights and the quality of its tertiary education. To capture
this reality, we assume that the stock of knowledge in country c is given by
Kc =
CX
j=1
KjcMj , (19)
where Kjc is a parameter that reects the extent to which cumulative research experience in
country j contributes to inventorsproductivity in country c. We assume that Kjc > 0 for all j
and c, so that every country reaps some spillover benets from research that takes place anywhere
in the world. Note that Kcc measures the e¤ectiveness with which country c converts its own
research experience into usable knowledge; this parameter is the same as what we denoted by K
in Section 2.3 above. The special case of complete international spillovers into country c can be
represented by setting Kjc = Kc for all j. If spillovers are complete and countries are symmetric
in their abilities to absorb knowledge, then Kjc = K for all j and c.
4.1 The E¤ects of Trade on Growth and Inequality
To solve the open-economy model, we make use of a separability property of the dynamic equilib-
rium. First note that, along a balanced-growth path, the number of di¤erentiated varieties grows
at the same rate in all countries; i.e., _Mc=Mc  gMc = gM for all c. In our one-sector model, this
implies a convergence also in growth rates of per capita income.29 The output of nal goods, X,
in the equations for the prots of a typical intermediate good (8) and in the labor-market clearing
condition (12), is replaced in the open economy by the market access Xc facing a typical producer
of intermediates in country c, where
Xc =
X
j
1 jc q

jXj .
This variable, as dened by Redding and Venables (2004), scales the aggregate demand facing an
intermediate good producer in country c (given its price), considering the production of nal goods
in each market, the cost of overcoming the trade barrier specic to the market, and the competition
the rm faces from other intermediate goods sold in that market (as reected in the price index for
intermediate goods). Since this variable enters multiplicatively on the left-hand side of (12), the
form of the matching function as described by the second-order di¤erential equation (15) remains
the same for the open economy as for the closed economy.
We can solve for the growth rate of varieties in country c and the cuto¤point for labor allocation
29As we know from Grossman and Helpman (1991), growth rates of per capita income can vary across countries
if there are multiple industries that produce nal goods and if countries di¤er in the compositions of their long-run
production patterns.
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aRc using two equations analogous to (16) and (18). In place of the former, we have
gMc = gM = cNcTc
Z amax
aRc
T (a) dH(a) , (20)
where c  Kc=Mc is the ratio of the knowledge stock in country c to the countrys own cumulative
experience in research. In place of the latter (and taking into account the R&D subsidy), we have
(1  sc) (+ gMc) = cNcTc (aRc) , (21)
where
 (aRc)  T (aRc)
(   1) (aRc; aRc)
Z aRc
amin
 (a; aRc) dH (a)
and  (a; aRc) is determined by an equation just like (17). The solution to (20) and (21) gives the
long-run values of gMc and aRc and the latter determines the entire distribution of relative wages in
country c, using (17) and Lemma 2. Then, separately, we can use a set of trade balance conditions
and labor-market clearing conditions to solve for the relative prices of nal goods and the wage
levels in each country.
A key observation is that c > Kcc for all c. That is, in an open economy, researchers anywhere
can draw on not only their own countrys accumulated research experience when inventing new
products, but also to some extent on the research experience that has accumulated outside their
borders. No matter what the extent of international knowledge spillovers, so long as they are
positive, a research rm in any country can be more productive in the open economy than in
autarky. This greater productivity translates a given labor input into greater innovation by (20)
and it reduces the cost of R&D that is embedded in the zero-prot condition in (21).
Now we are ready to compare (20) and (21) to their analogs that describe the closed-economy
equilibrium (with R&D subsidies). Note that the bigger c appears in place of the smaller Kcc (i.e.,
K) in each equation. Thus, the RR curve for the open economy lies proportionately above that
for the closed economy, whereas the AA curve for the open economy lies more than proportionately
above that for the closed economy. The two curves that determine the open-economy equilibrium
in country c cross above and to the left of the intersection depicted in Figure 4. Thus, in a trade
equilibrium, every country devotes more labor to research than in autarky and it invents new
varieties at a greater rate. The expansion of the research sector (fall in aRc) generates an increase
in wage inequality, both as a reection of the re-matching of the given mix of technologies with a
smaller and less able set of manufacturing workers and of the greater number of workers in research,
where ability is more amply rewarded. Meanwhile, the acceleration of innovation generates faster
growth of wages and nal output. We have established
Proposition 5 Suppose that intermediate goods are tradable. Countries may di¤er in their manu-
facturing productivities, their research productivities, their labor supplies, their R&D subsidies, and
their import tari¤s. In a balanced-growth equilibrium, every country grows faster with trade than
in autarky and every country has everywhere a more unequal income distribution with trade than
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in autarky.
4.2 Di¤erences in Manufacturing Productivity and Trade Barriers
Suppose now that countries di¤er only in their manufacturing productivities, as parameterized
by  c, and in their trade barriers, as reected in  jc. For the moment, we assume they are
equal in size (Nc = N for all c), equal in research productivity (Tc = T for all c), have similar
R&D subsidies (sc = s for all c) and benet symmetrically from complete international knowledge
spillovers (Kjc = K for all j and c). In these circumstances, a balanced-growth path with
gMc = gM requires c =  and aRc = aR for all c, per equations (20) and (21). It follows that not
only do the long-run growth rates converge internationally, but so too do the sizes and compositions
of the research sectors. Then, matching between technologies and worker types is the same in all
countries, and (17) applies worldwide with the same value of aR. As a result, the relative-wage
structure in the manufacturing sector is the same in all countries. So too is the wage prole in
R&D, by Lemma 2. In short, the same wage prole emerges in all countries, up to a factor of
proportionality. The di¤erences in manufacturing productivity and import tari¤ rates generate
cross-country heterogeneity only in wage levels. We summarize in
Proposition 6 Suppose that intermediate goods are tradable and countries di¤er only in manu-
facturing productivities and import tari¤s. Then all countries grow at the same rate in a balanced-
growth equilibrium and all have the same wage inequality in the long run.
It is also clear that, in these circumstances, the long-run value of  is independent of any  c
and  jc, in which case (20) and (21) imply that changes in manufacturing productivities or in trade
frictions do not a¤ect the long-run growth rate or relative wages in any country.30 Moreover, c
would be independent of  c and  jc (albeit not necessarily common across countries) if countries
were of di¤erent sizes, had di¤erent R&D subsidies, had di¤erent research productivities, or had
di¤erent capacities to generate or absorb international R&D spillovers. The parameters  c and
 jc do, of course, a¤ect income levels and consumer welfare.
4.3 Di¤erences in Innovation Capacity and in Ability to Create and Absorb
Knowledge Spillovers
Now suppose that all countries have equal R&D subsidy rates (sc = s for all c). They may di¤er in
size (Nc) and in research productivity (Tc). Moreover, there may be di¤erences in their abilities
to absorb R&D spillovers from abroad and in their abilities to convert research experience (their
own and foreign) into usable knowledge that facilitates subsequent innovation. Such di¤erences are
reected in the arbitrary matrix K = fKjcg of spillover parameters that determines knowledge
30With Kjc = K for all j and c, (19) yields Kc = K
PC
j=1Mj for all c, and thus c = K
PC
j=1Mj

=Mc for
all c. Then (20) and the fact established above that aRc = aR for all c imply that c =  = KC. Clearly,  is
independent of any  c or  jc.
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capital in country c, according to (19). Finally, as in Section 4.2, they may face or impose di¤erent
trade barriers  jc and operate with di¤erent manufacturing productivities,  c. In all of these cases,
(20) and (21) imply
gM
+ gM
=
(1  s) R amaxaRc T (a) dH (a)
 (aRc)
for all c. (22)
It is clear from (22) that, since all countries converge on the same long-run growth rate of
varieties, they must also have the same ability cuto¤ level aRc = aR. Then, all share a common long-
run wage prole. It is interesting to note that international integration generates a convergence in
income inequality around the globe, whereas di¤erences in innovation capacity give rise to di¤erent
degrees of inequality in autarky.
Although relative wages are the same in all countries, wage levels are not equalized internation-
ally. We show in Appendix 4.3, for example, that if intermediate goods are freely traded ( jc = 1
for all j and c) and knowledge spillovers are complete (Kjc = Kc for all c), the relative wages of
workers of any common ability level in countries i and j hinges on a comparison of KiTi versus
KjTj . The greater is the product of a countrys research productivity and its e¢ ciency in gen-
erating knowledge capital from global research experience, the greater is the level of its wages. If
trade is not free, a countrys size can also a¤ect the level of its wages due to a home-market e¤ect
that expands market access for its producers.
Next observe that with aRc = aR for all c, (20) implies that c  cNcTc takes a common
value across all countries, i.e., c =  for all c. Substituting  into (19), we have
c =
CX
j=1
jcj ,
where jc  KjcNcTc captures innovation capacity in the open economy and c Mc=
P
jMj is
the share of country c in the total number of varieties of intermediate goods in the world economy.
We recognize  as being a characteristic root of the matrix   = fjcg, with associated characteristic
vector  = fcg. Moreover, by the assumption that Kjc > 0 for all j and c, all elements of  
are strictly positive. Then the Perron-Frobenius Theorem implies that all elements of  can be
positive (as they must be) only if  is the largest characteristic root of  . Finally, the envelope
theorem implies that  must be increasing in every element jc of  .
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We have thus established that an increase in any spillover parameter Kjc, in any country size
Nc or in any R&D productivity parameter Tc, shifts upward the RR curve and the AA curve for
every country, and the former by more (at the initial aR) than the latter. The result is an increase
in the common rate of long-run growth and an increase in income inequality in every country.
31Multiplying the characteristic equation by c and summing over all c yields
 =
PC
c=1
PC
j=1 jcjcPC
c=1 (c)
2
The largest characteristic root is found by maximizing the right hand side with respect to fcg. By the envelope
theorem, the largest  is an increasing function of every jc.
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We record our ndings in
Proposition 7 Suppose that intermediate goods are tradable and all countries have the same R&D
subsidy s. Then all countries grow at the same rate in a balanced-growth equilibrium and all have
the same wage inequality in the long run. An increase in any spillover parameter Kc, in any
country size Nc or in any R&D productivity parameter Tc leads to faster growth and greater
income inequality in every country.
4.4 Di¤erences in R&D Subsidies
Suppose that international knowledge spillovers are complete and that countries are similar in
all ways except in their R&D subsidies and in the proportional wage taxes used to nance these
subsidies.32 It is clear from (20) that, with Nc = N and Tc = T for all c; convergence to a
common long-run growth rate requires
c =
K
PC
j=1
hR amax
aRj
T (a) dH (a)
i
R amax
aRc
T (a) dH (a)
.
That is, the ratio of the knowledge stock in country c to that countrys own cumulative experience in
research mirrors the ratio of aggregate world allocation of labor to R&D (adjusted for productivity)
relative to the countrys own allocation of labor to R&D (adjusted for productivity). Under these
circumstances, the long-run zero-prot conditions (21) vary across countries and therefore so too
do the equilibrium cuto¤ levels.
Let us compare two countries i and j such that si > sj ; i.e., country i supports research activities
more generously than does country j. Substituting the expressions for i and j into (21), we nd
1  si
1  sj =
(aRi) =
R amax
aRi
T (a) dH (a)
 (aRj) =
R amax
aRj
T (a) dH (a)
:
The right-hand side of this expression is increasing in aRi and decreasing in aRj , so si > sj implies
aRi < aRj ; i.e., the research sector is larger as a fraction of the labor force in the country that
promotes R&D more aggressively. This does not generate faster long-run growth in i than in j,
but it does spell a more unequal long-run income distribution there.
Although wage proles do not converge in the presence of (di¤erential) R&D subsidies, such
policies do a¤ect growth and inequality throughout the world. To examine these spillover e¤ects of
innovation policy, we treat (20) and (21) as a system of C+1 equations that determines the C cuto¤
ability levels and the common growth rate, gM . We prove in Appendix A4.4 that an increase in an
arbitrary subsidy rate si leads to an expansion of the research sectors in all countries.33 In other
32 It is relatively easy to verify that the implications of di¤erences in research support would be the same as we
describe here, even if we allowed for cross-country di¤erences in innovation capacity and in tari¤ rates. However, we
assume that these features are common in order to simplify the exposition.
33The proof involves substituting (20) into the C equations that comprise (21) and then totally log di¤erentiating
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words, daRj=dsi < 0 for all i; j 2 f1; : : : ; Cg. It follows that an increase in a single subsidy rate
contributes not only to faster innovation throughout the world economy, but also to a spreading of
the long-run wage distribution everywhere. We summarize in
Proposition 8 Suppose that intermediate goods are tradable, that international knowledge spillovers
are complete, and that countries di¤er only in their R&D subsidy rates. Comparing any two coun-
tries, the long-run wage distribution is everywhere more unequal in the one with the greater subsidy
rate. An increase in any subsidy rate raises the common long-run growth rate and generates a
spread in the distribution of wages in every country.
4.5 Di¤erences in Technology Sets
Our last comparison involves countries whose innovators draw from di¤erent technology sets. As
in Section 3.4, we take Gc (') to be a truncated Pareto distribution with shape parameter k > 2
(common to all countries) and with a range in country c given by ['min; 'c]. In (21), we now write
 (aRc; 'c), to emphasize the fact that the upper limit of the technology distribution a¤ects the
matching between workers and technologies and thus the relative wage prole,  (a; aRc; 'c). Note,
however, that if two countries share the same ability cuto¤ and the same maximum technology
level, they will have the same matching and wage proles in manufacturing; i.e.,  () and  () take
the same forms in all countries, given 'c.
Suppose that international knowledge spillovers are complete, that countries are equal in size
(Nc = N), have the same R&D productivity (Tc = T for all c), have the same capacity to convert
the global knowledge stock into usable knowledge capital (Kc = K for all c) and impose the same
R&D subsidies (sc = s for all c). In these circumstances, if the countries di¤er with respect to 'c,
convergence in growth rates again requires
c =
K
PC
j=1
hR amax
aRj
T (a) dH (a)
i
R amax
aRc
T (a) dH (a)
,
just as in the case with di¤erential R&D subsidies. Substituting this value of c; and  (aRc; 'c) ;
into (21), and using the assumption that R&D subsidies are common across all countries, we see
that the cuto¤ ability levels cannot be the same in countries where innovators draw from di¤erent
productivity sets. In fact, c (aRc; 'c) is increasing in aRc but decreasing in 'c, so a country
that draws from a better set of production technologies has a larger value of aRc, thus a larger
manufacturing sector and a smaller R&D sector. All countries grow at the same rate along the
balanced growth-path, as growth is driven by the accumulation of global knowledge capital.
the result with respect to the vector of net-of-subsidy elements f1  scg and nding the matrix As that pre-multiplies
the vector fdaRc=aRcg in the resulting system. We show that As has positive diagonal elements and negative o¤-
diagonal elements and that there exists a diagonal matrix Ds such that AsDs is diagonally dominant of its rows
(i.e., the row sum is positive for each row). This implies that As is an M-matrix (Johnson, 1982) and therefore the
inverse matrix A 1s has only positive elements.
31
In the long run, income inequality di¤ers systematically across countries. On the one hand, a
better set of technologies implies better matching opportunities for workers in the manufacturing
sector. On the other hand, the induced change in the composition of workers in manufacturing
intensies the competition for the good technologies. But by arguments similar to those used to
prove Proposition 4, it turns out that the former force must dominate. If 'i > 'j , then aRi > aRj
and so a manufacturing worker of given ability in country i nds a better technology match than
his counterpart of similar ability in country j. Consequently, manufacturing wages are less equally
distributed in country i than in country j. However, the manufacturing sector is larger in country
i than in country j, so a smaller set of workers enjoy the higher returns to ability that research
work a¤ords. Overall, inequality in country i is greater than that in country j for individuals with
ability a < aRj , but inequality is at least as great in country j as in country i for individuals with
a > aRj . Finally, as in autarky, there are workers in the middle of the ability distribution in country
i who earn more relative to both the most able and least able of their countryman than do their
counterparts of similar ability in country j. We record
Proposition 9 Suppose that intermediate goods are tradable, that international knowledge spillovers
are complete, and that countries di¤er only in the technology sets from which their inventors draw.
If Gc (') is a truncated Pareto distribution with shape parameter k > 2 and with a range in country
c given by ['min; 'c] and if 'i > 'j, then inequality in country i is greater than that in country j
for workers with ability a < aRj, but inequality is at least as great in country j as in country i for
workers with ability a > aRj. There exists a range of abilities A = [a; a] such that for a 2 A,
wi (a) =wi (amin) > wj (a) =wj (amin) and wi (a) =wi (amax) > wj (a) =wj (amax).
The main lessons from this section are threefold. First, international integration a¤ords re-
searchers access to a larger knowledge stock, which raises research productivity worldwide and leads
to an acceleration of innovation and growth. At the same time, the expansion of each countrys
idea-generating sector spells a ubiquitous increase in wage inequality. Second, national conditions
that create di¤erential incentives for research versus manufacturing generate long-run di¤erences
in wage distributions, whereas conditions that a¤ect a countrys ability to contribute to or draw on
the worlds stock of knowledge capital lead to a convergence in wage distributions but with cross-
country di¤erences in wage levels. Finally, technological conditions or government policies that
cause an expansion of the research sector in one country typically have spillover e¤ects abroad. In
particular, when the incentives for R&D rise somewhere, the induced expansion in knowledge cap-
ital generates a positive growth spillover for other countries and a tendency for income inequality
to rise everywhere.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have studied in depth one mechanism that links long-run growth and income
distribution. The mechanism operates via sorting and matching in the labor market. We posit
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that the most able individuals in any economy specialize in creating ideas and that innovation is
the engine of growth. Among those that use ideas rather than create them, a complementarity
between ability and technology dictates matching between the more able individuals and the more
sophisticated and productive technologies. In the long run, the size of what we call the research
sector determines not only the pace of innovation, but also the composition of the manufacturing
sector and therefore the matching between workers and technologies that results.
We have explored this mechanism in a very simple economic environment. We have abstracted
from diversity in manufacturing industries, from team production activities that involve multiple
individuals in both research and manufacturing, from capital inputs that may be complementary
to certain worker or inventor types, and from a host of market frictions that can impede job
placement and nancing for innovation. Nonetheless, we have been able to shed light on a rich set
of interactions between growth and inequality. Typically, but not ubiquitously, faster growth goes
hand in hand with greater inequality; a larger research sector spells higher returns for the most
able individuals in the economy as well as better technological matches for workers in the (smaller)
manufacturing sector, which tends to favor especially those manufacturing workers that are more
able and better paid. We have identied technological and policy features of the economy that a¤ect
long-run inequality and others that a¤ect only levels of income but not relative compensation.
By allowing for international trade and international knowledge spillovers, we introduced links
between inequality measures in di¤erent countries. Generally, we nd that within-country income
inequality is exacerbated by globalization. The mechanism is not the usual one, however, i.e., that
trade leads to specialization in sectors that di¤er in factor intensity, but rather that international
knowledge sharing makes innovation more productive and so creates incentives for expansion of the
idea-generating portion of the economy worldwide. As the research sector expands in every country
so too does the relative pay for the most able individuals (who engage in innovation) as well as for
the more able workers that sort to manufacturing. As a rule, the more able workers in manufacturing
benet relatively more from the improved matching with technologies. Our treatment of the open
economy also allows us to study the links between conditions and policies in one country and
growth and distributional outcomes in its trade partners. For example, we nd that an R&D
subsidy in one country accelerates growth in all countries and increases within-country income
inequality throughout the globe. While previous work on endogenous growth emphasized cross-
country dependence in growth rates (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1991), our model also features
cross-country dependence in wage inequality. Moreover, while long-run growth rates converge,
cross-country di¤erences in wage inequality can persist even along a balanced-growth path.
Numerous possible extensions of our model come to mind. Additional elements of interde-
pendence would arise if production functions involved multiple factors of production (or teams
of individuals) and if sectors di¤ered in their relative factor intensities. We also suspect that in-
vestment in ideas has more dimensions of uncertainty than just the productivity of the resulting
technology, and that the prospects for success in innovation and the range of reachable technologies
depend on the abilities of the individuals who generate the new ideas. Imperfect information about
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worker characteristics and frictions in labor markets undoubtedly impede the smooth, assortative
matching that features in our model. Similarly, asymmetric information about research ideas and
nancing constraints impede investment in innovation and bias technological outcomes. All of these
extensions would be interesting.
We view our contribution in this paper not as a nal word on the link between growth and
inequality, but as an exploration of a core mechanism that will play a role in richer economic
environments. The empirical importance of this mechanism remains to be settled, although at this
stage it is not obvious how to do so in light of the limited availability of historical data and the
endogeneity of the variables of interest.
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Appendix
A2.4 Uniqueness and Single Crossing of Matching Function
In Section 2.4 we stated that the solution to the pair of di¤erential equations (11) and (13) that satises
the boundary conditions (14) is unique, and later that the matching functions of two solutions to (11) and
(13) that apply for di¤erent boundary conditions can intersect at most once. Here, we prove these statements
by adapting Lemma 2 in the appendix of Grossman et al. (2013) to the current circumstances.
We begin with the latter claim. As in Grossman et al. (2013), let [m{ (') ; w{ (a)] and [m% (') ; w% (a)]
be solutions to the di¤erential equations (11) and (13), each for di¤erent boundary conditions,
m ('min) = az;min and m ('max) = az;max , z = {; %. (23)
Let the solutions intersect for some ' = '0 and a = a0. Without loss of generality, suppose thatm
0
% ('0) >
m0{ ('0). We will now show that m% (') > m{ (') for all ' > '0 and m% (') < m{ (') for all ' < '0
in the overlapping set of ('; a).
To see this, suppose to the contrary there exists a '1 > '0 such that m% ('1)  m{ ('1). Then di¤er-
entiability of mz (), z = {; %, implies that there exists a '2 with '2 > '0 such that m% ('2) = m{ ('2),
m% (') > m{ (') for all ' 2 ('0; '2) andm0% ('2) < m0{ ('2). This also implies thatm 1% (a) < m 1{ (a)
for all a 2 (m% ('0) ;m% ('2)), where m 1z () is the inverse of mz (). But then (13) implies that
w% [m% ('0)] < w{ [m% ('0)] and w% [m% ('2)] > w{ [m% ('2)], and therefore
lnw{ [m% ('2)]  lnw{ [m% ('0)] < lnw% [m% ('2)]  lnw% [m% ('0)] :
On the other hand, (11) implies that
lnwz [m% ('2)]  lnwz [m% ('0)] =
Z m%('2)
m%('0)
 a

m 1z (a) ; a

 

m 1z (a) ; a
 da; z = {; %:
Together with the previous inequality, this givesZ m%('2)
m%('0)
 a

m 1{ (a) ; a

 

m 1{ (a) ; a
 da < Z m%('2)
m%('0)
 a

m 1% (a) ; a

 

m 1% (a) ; a
 da:
Note, however, that strict log supermodularity of  () andm 1% (a) < m 1{ (a) for all a 2 (m% ('0) ;m% ('2))
imply the reverse inequality, which establishes a contradiction. It follows that m% (') > m{ (') for all
' > '0. A similar argument shows that m% (') < m{ (') for all ' < '0.
The fact that the matching functions for di¤erent boundary conditions can cross at most once im-
mediately implies the uniqueness of the solution to (11) and (13) for a given set of boundary conditions,
m ('min) = amin and m ('max) = aR. If there were two di¤erent solutions for these boundary conditions,
the resulting matching functions would have to intersect at least twice, which is not possible.
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A2.5 The AA Curve
In this appendix, we derive the equation for the AA curve and establish that it is upward sloping.
We use the labor-market clearing condition (12) for ' = 'max. After substituting the boundary condition
m ('max) = aR and the denition of the relative-wage function  (a; aR) = w (a; aR) =w (amin; aR) into
this equation, we obtain
MX


   1
  Z 'max
'min
 [m ('; aR) ; aR]
1 
 [';m ('; aR)]
1  dG (') = w (amin; aR)
N
Z aR
amin
 (a; aR) dH (a) : (24)
Now combine (24) with the free-entry condition (10), then (8) and the fact that the wage schedule is
continuous at aR to derive + gM = KN (aR), where
 (aR)  T (aR)
(   1) (aR; aR)
Z aR
amin
 (a; aR) dH (a) :
Now, (log) di¤erentiating the expression for  (aR) gives
0 (aR)
 (aR)
=
H 0 (aR)R aR
amin
(a;aR)
(aR;aR)
dH (a)
+

T 0 (aR)
T (aR)
  1 (aR; aR)
 (aR; aR)

+
01 (b)
1 (b)

b=aR
; (25)
where 1 (a; b) is the partial derivative of  (a; b) with respect to a and
1 (b) 
Z aR
amin
 (a; b)
 (aR; b)
dH (a) =
Z aR
amin
w (a; b)
w (aR; b)
dH (a) :
In this representation, 1 (b) is the integral of the wage ratios at a and aR, weighted by the density H 0 (a),
when the cuto¤ is b. Naturally, this expression applies only for b  max fa; aRg.
Next note that the rst term on the right-hand side of (25) is positive. The second term also is positive,
because Assumption 2 that ensures the sorting of the most able individuals into R&D and the continuity of
the wage schedule at aR. To sign the third term, observe that (11) implies
lnw (a1; aR)  lnw (a2; aR) =
Z a1
a2
 a

m 1 (; aR) ; 

 [m 1 (; aR) ; ]
d for all a1; a2 2 [amin; aR]
and therefore
w (a; b)
w (aR; b)
= exp
(
 
Z aR
a
 a

m 1 (; b) ; 

 [m 1 (; b) ; ]
d
)
;
wherem 1 (; b) is the inverse matching function when the highest ability worker in manufacturing is b. An
increase in b reduces the quality of matches for all workers in manufacturing and therefore reducesm 1 (; b)
for all ability levels, . The log supermodularity of the productivity function dictated by Assumption 1 then
implies that  a

m 1 (; b) ; 

= 

m 1 (; b) ; 

declines for all  and, therefore, that w (a; b) =w (aR; b)
increases for all a < aR. It follows that 1 (b) is increasing for all b, including for b! aR. Hence the third
term on the right-hand side of (25) also is positive. We have thus shown that 0 (aR) > 0.
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A4.3 Cross-Country Wage Levels with Di¤erences in Innovation Capacity
Here we consider the cross-country di¤erences in wage levels that result from asymmetries in innovation
capacity. We assume equal R&D subsidy rates and complete international knowledge spillovers; i.e., sj = s
and Kjc = Kc for all j. Note that this allows for international di¤erences in capacities to convert knowledge
capital into new varieties, as captured by Kc. We also allow for di¤erences in country size, Nc, and for
di¤erences in research productivity, Tc.
We have seen in Section 4.3 that, with di¤erences in innovation capacity, the cuto¤ ability levels aRc are
the same in all countries, and so therefore are the distributions of wages. We represent the wage schedule in
country c by wc (a) = !cw (a) and refer to !c as the wage level in country c.
Substituting the expression for prots analogous to (8) that applies to the open economy into the free-
entry condition analogous to (10) that does likewise, and taking the ratio of the resulting equations that
hold for two countries i and j, we nd
!1 i Xi
!1 j Xj
=
!i
KiTi
KjTj
!j
or
!i
!j
=

KiTi Xi
KjTj Xj
1=
: (26)
If intermediate goods are freely trade ( jc = 1 for all j and c), then Xc = X =
PC
j=1Xj ; i.e., market
access is the same in all countries. Under these circumstances, (26) implies that the relative wage levels in
any pair of countries i and j varies monotonically with (KiTi) = (KjTj) and does not depend on their
relative size, Ni=Nj . If, on the other hand, there exist barriers to trade, then market access will not be the
same in all countries. With equal trade barriers  jc =  > 1 for j 6= c, a home-market e¤ect would generate
a greater market access for larger countries and therefore higher wages.
A4.4 Spillover E¤ects of National R&D Subsidies
In this appendix, we examine the e¤ects of changing an R&D subsidy in one country on growth and
inequality in that country and in all trading partners.
As in Section 4.4, we suppose that international knowledge spillovers are complete and that countries are
similar in all ways except in their R&D subsidies and in the proportional wage taxes used to nance these
subsidies. Under these circumstances, (20) implies
c =
K
PC
j=1
R amax
aRj
T (a) dH (a)R amax
aRc
T (a) dH (a)
:
Substituting for c in (20) and (21), and then substituting the former equation into the latter, we can reduce
the set of equilibrium conditions to the following system of C equations in the C unknowns, aRc:
(1  sc)
+ KNT
PC
j=1
R amax
aRj
T (a) dH (a)
KNT
PC
j=1
R amax
aRj
T (a) dH (a)
Z amax
aRc
T (a) dH (a) =  (aRc) for all c.
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Now we proportionately di¤erentiate this system of equations and write the (matrix) equation for the
proportional changes as
Asas = bs;
where
as =
0BBBBBBBBB@
a^R1
a^R2



a^RC
1CCCCCCCCCA
; bs =
0BBBBBBBBB@
\(1  s1)
\(1  s2)



\(1  sC)
1CCCCCCCCCA
;
and a hatover a variable represents a proportional rate of change; i.e., a^Rc = daRc=aRc and \(1  sc) =
d (1  sc) = (1  sc).
We note that the matrix As has positive diagonal elements and negative o¤-diagonal elements. In
particular, in row j, the diagonal element is "j +
 
1  j

"Rj , where "j > 0 is the elasticity of  ()
evaluated at aRj , "Rj > 0 is minus the elasticity of
R amax
aR
T (a) dH (a) with respect to aR evaluated at
aRj , and
j =
"

+ KN
PC
i=1
R amax
aRi
T (a) dH (a)
#
Mj
M

< 1.
For j 6= c, the o¤-diagonal element in column j is  j"Rj < 0.
Inasmuch as As has only negative o¤-diagonal elements, we recognize that it is a Z-matrix. Moreover,
there exists a diagonal matrix Ds such that AsDs is diagonally dominant in its rows. To see this, consider
the diagonal matrix Ds that has a diagonal entry in row j given by 1="Rj . Then the diagonal element in
row c and column c of AsDs is given by "c="Rc + (1  c) and the o¤-diagonal element in row c and
column j is given by  j . Summing the entries in any row c gives "c="Rc + 1 
PC
j=1 j > 0, where the
inequality follows from the fact that
PC
j=1 j < 1.
Having established that As is a Z-matrix and there exists a diagonal matrix Ds such that AsDs is
diagonally dominant in its rows, it follows that As is an M -matrix (see Johnson, 1982). Then its inverse,
A 1s , has only positive elements. We conclude that an increase in any subsidy rate (i.e., a reduction in any
1   sc) reduces every cuto¤ point aRj , j = 1; : : : ; C. Since more individuals are hired as researchers in
every country, every country grows faster and experiences greater income inequality.
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